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Abstract
This article focuses on one of the most salient aspects of the EU-ACP relations, namely the conditionality of aid assis-
tance and it traces the origins of conditionality in the influence of the neoliberal doctrine widespread within the World 
Bank. The analysis of the World Bank as a social environment bolstered by the use of cognitive mapping of assertions of 
European officials and official documents is used to appraise the functioning of the microprocesses of socialisation. Ac-
cordingly, with a structure-centred constructivist approach this article argues that the EU development policy toward the 
ACP countries was influenced by the conceptions and practices within the World Bank. Nevertheless, the novelty of the 
approach utilised here is the focus on the mechanisms of propelling of the socialised norms and doctrines rather than 
their content: a thorough analysis of the microprocesses of socialisation is applied to the World Bank. The acknowledg-
ment of the origins of the conditionality, which has become typical of the EU’s development policy, is crucial in order to 
appreciate the history and the future of the relations between the EU and its former colonies.
Introduction
The objective of this analysis is to trace the origins 
of conditionality in EU1 development policy toward 
the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries. 
In other terms, this is an inquiry into the causes of 
the shift from “a support to the likes of Amin, Bokassa 
or Mobutu” (Guardian 1993) through “[structural] 
adjustment [which] has become the daily bread of 
the vast majority of the countries of Africa and a sine 
qua non of their dialogue with the outside world” 
(Frisch and Boidin 1988: 67) to “the respect for human 
rights, democratic principle and the rule of law … shall 
constitute an essential element of this Convention” (art. 
5 Lomé IV- bis and then art. 9 Cotonou Agreement). 
Not only is this topic theoretically relevant given the 
1  EU and EC are used interchangeably since the origins of 
conditionality date back to the end of the 80s and the beginning 
of the 90s, but the phenomena analysed in this work are not 
limited to that period.
vast literature which has hitherto focused on it, but it 
is also politically and socially salient. This article focuses 
on one of the most employed and criticized paradigms 
of development assistance—conditionality. Aid 
conditionality refers to “conditioning aid on a number 
of prerequisites and promises of reform, [which] has 
been extended from the economic realm to the 
political arena” (Santiso 2001: 10). Nowadays, the vast 
majority of actors involved in development assistance 
employ some types of conditionality. On the one 
hand, conditionality has been perceived as a sensitive 
strategy to incentivise economic and political reforms 
within developing countries, in which too often aid 
encourages corruption and bad governance (Bauer 
1991). Furthermore, ‘charity assistance’ has proved to 
put the recipient country in a never-ending vicious 
circle of dependence vis-à-vis donors (Moss et al 2006). 
On the other hand, developing countries have seen 
conditionality as old colonialism in new bottles mining 
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their suffered independence (Woods 2006). This issue is 
even more relevant in a context such as the European 
one in which imperialism is still fresh in the minds of 
people. 
This article commences with an historical overview of 
EU development policy toward the ACP countries and 
special attention is devoted to the policy paradigm 
of conditionality. The first section analyses the 
development of such a concept from its theoretical 
origins from the employment by international financial 
institutions (IFIs) to its use in the EU’s context. The 
second section copes with the theoretical state of art, 
focusing on the various approaches hitherto utilized to 
tackle the issue at stake. The ensuing section analyses 
the World Bank as a social environment in order to test 
whether socialisation is at work therein. Accordingly, 
this article argues that the World Bank is conducive for 
persuasion dynamics and a case-study is taken into 
consideration in order to test the validity of such an 
argument. Indeed, through the method of cognitive 
mapping the final section uncovers the effects of the 
persuasion dynamics on European development policy. 
The Historical Background
The relation between the European Union and the 
ACP countries finds their roots in the French colonial 
experience since 1871 (Grilli, 1994). After the Franco-
Prussian war, France had to revise its approach to 
colonialism, which until then had been based on 
merely commercial interests. The new doctrine 
delineated by philosophers such as Ferry and Leroy-
Beaulieu was characterized by strong emphasis on the 
moral obligations which colonialism bore (Rist, 1997): 
‘the white man’s burden’ entered the European colonial 
narrative vis-à-vis African countries. This influenced the 
development discourse in the aftermath of World War 
II in a significant manner, though another characteristic 
of French colonialism was crucial. In fact, the 1946 
French Constitution established what has been labelled 
‘associationism’, namely a variety of links between the 
mother country and the colonies based on equality 
of rights and obligations (Grilli, 1994). Possessions 
were intertwined with France in a quasi-federalism, in 
which resources were pooled in order to sustain that 
feeling of solidarity which was at the basis of the French 
empire. In 1957 the concept of associationism was 
transposed into the Part IV of the Treaty of Rome and it 
was adapted to the new European reality (Grilli, 1994). 
Accordingly, the main pillars were: a free trade among 
the EC states and their present and former African 
dependencies and multilateral economic aid. Through 
the various reforms of the agreements between the 
EC and its former colonies, namely the 1963 Yaoundé 
I Convention and its successor in 1969, a clear pattern 
was delineated. ,Economic aid was provided both in 
bilateral and multilateral manner2 and the increase of 
local production was triggered by a free trade area (Arts 
and Dickson, 2004).
In the mid-1970s the approach toward the developing 
world mutated drastically due to two factors. First, the 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) established 
in 1971 shifted the attention to the poorest countries 
(e.g. sub-Saharan Africa), although the signatories of 
the Yaoundé conventions maintained their privileges 
(Dinan 2005). Second, when Great Britain joined the 
EC in 1973 with its colonial legacy a revision of the 
European approach toward development became 
necessary. As a consequence, the extension to 46 
countries characterized the 1975 Lomé I Convention. 
Inspired by the New International Economic Order 
(NIEO), Lomé I Agreement bore two novelties. First, a 
system of stabilization of prices for the exports from the 
ACP countries was included in the agreement. Second, 
a complex inter-institutional framework was created in 
order to improve the multilateralism of the decision-
making process. In fact, the ACP-EC Council and the 
inter-parliamentary assembly soon assumed the role 
of fora in which decisions were reached in the most 
concerted manner (Dinan 2005). New agreements 
were negotiated every five years until 2000 when the 
parts signed the Cotonou Agreement, which in turn 
was reformed in 2010.
The 1990 Lomé IV introduced a significant novelty in 
the EC approach. Despite maintaining the previous 
provisions, it introduced the concept of ‘structural 
adjustment’. Such a new policy paradigm was first 
utilised by the World Bank in 1979 in response to the 
debt crisis in the 1970s (Brown 2002). The Berg Report 
issued in 1981 provided the theoretical background 
for economic conditionality questing for a neoliberal 
approach to development assistance. Accordingly, 
recipients had to undergo various reforms in order 
to obtain loans: a decrease in the role of the state in 
the economy, de-nationalisation of firms, and the 
removal of trade barriers (Arts and Dickson, 2004). The 
IMF introduced structural adjustment in its policies 
in the 1980s thus becoming the main doctrine of the 
so called ‘establishment’. Economic adjustment was 
in 1989, encapsulated in the neoliberal ideology and 
diffused through the main practitioners in this field: the 
‘Washington consensus’. The latter consisted of a set of 
economic policy paradigms aimed at expanding the 
2  The European development Fund (EDF) was established 
in 1958 with the objective of complementing and not 
substituting the pre-existing aid.
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free market to developing countries (Williamson, 2004). 
Other types of conditionality have been employed in 
the history of the relations between the EC/EU and the 
ACP countries: from the political one of Lomé IV-bis to 
a more complex concept of conditionality in Cotonou 
(i.e., ‘good governance’). The main novelty introduced 
by the revision of Lomé in 1995 is its emphasis on 
human rights, environmental protection and the need 
for self-reliant development. Recipient states had to 
show serious committees in this regard in order to be 
eligible for funding. The Cotonou Agreement, on its 
part, included these elements though introducing the 
concept of ‘good governance’. This was in line with the 
then main approach to development, which stigmatized 
the role of factors endogenous to underdeveloped 
countries as the main reasons for their conditions (Bauer, 
1991). Accordingly, the locus of intervention shifted 
to corruption, maladministration and the rule of law 
(Dinan, 2005). Despite acknowledging the importance 
of these two types of conditionality, this article focuses 
on the economic one for reasons clarified in the 
methodological section.
The Theoretical State of Art
A vast literature concentrates on the origins of 
conditionality in the relations between the EU and 
the ACP countries. Two main fields of studies have 
developed in this regard: one focusing on exogenous 
factors and the other on endogenous factors. 
Scholars such as Grilli (1994),  Arts (2004) and Claeys 
(2004) attribute the cause of the shift of approach to 
development assistance and thus the introduction 
of conditionality to European enlargement. The 
accession of new members have broaden the scope 
of European development policy thus rendering the 
special privileges, which the signatories of the previous 
agreements had enjoyed, no more feasible (Arts 2004). 
In addition, the accession of Great Britain with its own 
tradition of colonial rule diluted French associationism, 
which had been crucial until then in determining 
European development policy (Grilli 1994). Thirdly, the 
reduction of the influence of the French approach to 
development was triggered also by the dismantling 
of French monopoly on the key positions in European 
institutions (Claeys 2004). , until the 1970s France had 
managed to forge the Commission’s organs dealing 
with its former and present colonies on the model of its 
national administrative structures. Furthermore, many 
French civil servants had operated in the Directorate-
General (DG) in charge of development policy, 
including some former administrateurs coloniaux 
(Claeys 2004). Whilst this article argues in favour of a 
systemic approach, it does not arbitrarily dismiss these 
arguments. It is beyond any doubt that enlargement 
has contributed to the abandonment of the policy 
paradigms typical of the first decades. Nevertheless, 
although these theories explain why an approach 
to development was abandoned, they fall short in 
explaining why another one was adopted.
Many authors explicitly or implicitly recognise the 
influence of the world-wide ‘development discourse’ 
(in its broad meaning) and its practices on the EU-ACP 
relation since the 80s. A telling example in this regard 
is represented by Grilli (1994: 43): “Lomé IV [represents 
the] beginning of a substantial movement in EC-
ACP relation away from any pretense of partnership 
and towards a more traditional (and thus inherently 
unequal) North-South relation in both trade and 
aid”. Furthermore, Brown (2002; 2004) and Dickson 
(2004) acknowledge the influence of the international 
‘establishment’ (respectively the World Bank and the 
World Trade Organisation) on EC development policy. 
Albeit the accuracy which characterise the analysis of 
the content of conditionality as employed by the IFIs and 
the European institutions, these studies tend to neglect 
the mechanisms whereby the IFIs influenced the EC in 
this regard. This paper tries to circumvent this fallacy by 
focusing on the conduct of policy paradigms through 
socialisation processes within social environments.
Methodology
This paper argues in favour of a structure-centred 
constructivist approach to EU development policy 
toward the ACP countries by analysing international 
institutions as social environments conducive for 
socialisation dynamics. The analysis of socialisation 
dynamics in international institutions, conceived as 
social environments, is facilitated by the presence of 
a particular normative structure which influences the 
relation actor-structure. Furthermore, in institutions the 
action of norm entrepreneurs and the effects of social 
pressure are more clearly identifiable than in other 
contexts. Accordingly, many scholars (Johnston 2001; 
Johnston 2008; Checkel 1999) recognise the theoretical 
relevance of analysing international institutions as 
social environments. Three caveats regarding the theory 
employed are needed. First, this paper does not fall in the 
“epistemological traps of sociological institutionalism” 
(Johnston, 2008: 492)3, which stresses the importance 
of the macro-historical diffusion of (Western) values 
and thus focusing on the content of socialisation 
without deepening the process of socialisation itself. 
3 For a thorough illustration of sociology’s institutionalism 
see Finnemore (1996).
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Second, this paper acknowledges the contributions of 
agent-centred constructivism (Wendt 1992; Checkel 
1998; Katzenstein 1996), especially regarding the role 
of norm-entrepreneurs in the creation of structures 
of identities and interests (Wendt 1992), nevertheless 
it focuses on the propelling of such inter-subjective 
understandings within social environments. Third, this 
paper analyzes the micro-processes of socialization by 
focusing on persuasion, perceived as the imposition of 
inter-subjective understandings through a reiterated 
interaction between agents (Widmaier et al.2007). This 
choice is based on the capacity hitherto developed by 
the literature to measure persuasion, rather than social 
influence. Whilst several analytical devices to measure 
the effects of persuasion are available, the capacity 
to analyse the ones of the other processes is very 
limited in scope and reliability. Accordingly, this article 
questions whether the interaction between the World 
Bank (structure) and the EU (agent) is conducive for 
persuasion dynamics.
The article uses cognitive mapping—a technique 
used to uncover the linkages between certain causal 
axioms and their estimated behavioural effects 
(Johnston1995; Axelrod 1976). The article adopts 
the concept of socialisation in social environments, 
because first of all, socialisation occurs within social 
environments, in which discursive dynamics are at 
work. As a consequence, the focus of the analysis has to 
be not only on the practical attitudes and behaviours 
of actors, but also on the rhetorical aspect (Checkel 
1999). Second, content analysis of official documents or 
statements of key actors is of fundamental importance. 
The causal judgements extrapolated from these units 
of analysis may reveal whether they juxtapose with 
the ones dominant in the social environment and thus 
revealing an internalisation of norms. Furthermore, 
by capturing certain linguistic cues such a method 
may uncover the process whereby the internalisation 
of norms occurs. As suggested by Johnston (2008), 
different rhetorical signals are associated to the various 
micro-processes of socialisation. The method of 
cognitive mapping has revealed very useful in social 
sciences, though when applied to difficultly isolatable 
phenomena (e.g. persuasion and social influence) its 
results may be subjected to different interpretations. 
Social influence may also function as a prerequisite 
for persuasion. Furthermore, this article acknowledges 
the instrumental use of rhetoric and inter-subjective 
arguments (Glenn et al. 1970), especially in the relation 
between political elites and public opinion (Widmaier, 
Blyth and Seabrooke 2007). Nevertheless, cognitive 
mapping remains one of the most effective tools in this 
field.
Whilst conditionality has many forms, this article focuses 
on the one directly related to the ‘Washington consensus’, 
which represents the first form of conditionality inserted 
in the EC-ACP relations. The reasons for this choice are 
manifold. First, “Lomé IV [represents the] beginning of a 
substantial movement in EC-ACP relation” (Grilli, 1994: 
43), as stated above. Structural adjustment represents 
the first case in which European development policy 
has employed conditionality. Second, its representation 
of a drastic change in policy paradigms affects positively 
the empirical analysis. Content analysis is more reliable 
when radically new paradigms are introduced since 
causal assertions related to such new paradigms may 
be more easily isolated from previous ones. Third, 
structural adjustment is a more delimited  policy 
paradigm, which may be unequivocally captured by 
the discursive analysis in the final section of this article. 
Other types of conditionality, such as the ones based 
on human rights, are more difficult to be isolated 
from the political rhetorical etiquette. Furthermore, 
the neoliberal doctrine, which is assumed to be the 
main doctrine of the social environment in the case-
study (Woods, 2006), bore a clearly identifiable type of 
conditionality—the economic one. Other narratives 
on the approach to development have not been 
characterised by such a linearity in determining the 
type of conditionality to be attached to aid.
Socialisation and Social 
Environments 
Socialisation is generally conceived as “a process 
of internalizing new identities and interests, not 
something occurring outside [actors] and affecting 
only behaviour .... socialization is a cognitive process, 
not just a behavioural one” (Wendt, 1992: 399). However, 
there are different degrees of internalisation of norms 
and values which explain a pro-norm behaviour. Three 
micro-processes are identified: mimicking, social 
influence and persuasion (Johnston, 2001). The former 
perceives pro-norm behaviour as the borrowing of the 
language, habits etc. and thus as a way of acting due 
to the first reaction to a novel environment: “I shall do X 
because everyone seems to do it and thus survives. So 
until I know better, X is what I shall do” (Betz et al, 1996: 
116). Social influence conceives pro-norm behaviour as 
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a function of an actor’s sensitivity to social rewards and 
punishments, such as psychological well-being, status 
markers, sense of belonging etc: “I believe the answer is 
X, but others said Y, and I do not want to rock the boat, 
so I shall say Y” (Betz et al1996: 116). Persuasion refers to 
pro-norm behaviour as an effect of the internalisation of 
the values and the culture of the group, thus assuming a 
taken-for-granted or an appropriate nature (March and 
Olsen 2009): “I do X because it is good and normal for me” 
(Betz, Skowronski and Ostrom,1996: 116). Persuasion is 
based on the ‘logic of appropriateness’, whereas the 
former types rely on a marked ‘logic of consequence’. 
In such cases the actor maximizes different forms of 
utility: in mimicking survival and in social influence the 
social status (Johnston, 2001). A caveat is needed: in 
this article the concept of persuasion entails something 
more than the one employed by Habermas (1996) in his 
discourse theory of democracy, on which many authors 
draw. In other terms, persuasion is not only deliberation 
as the strategic attempt to convince other actors in an 
inter pares situation through reasoning and arguing 
(Hasenclever et al 1997). Persuasion is triggered either 
through discursive processes based on the content of 
the message, namely pure arguing or through the role 
of a catalyst. In other words, environments in which “the 
persuader is an authoritative member of the in-group to 
which the persuadee belongs” (Checkel 1999: 550) are 
more conducive of persuasion. As a consequence, this 
article focuses also on the role of norm-entrepreneurs. 
Furthermore, this article emphasises the role of the 
institutional structure of social environments and how 
it affects the dynamics whereby norms are interiorised. 
The role of norm-entrepreneurs may not be duly 
appreciated without any consideration on the allocation 
of authoritativeness in a group or on the mechanisms 
of the decision-making process.
Johnston (2001; 2008) traces a typology of social 
environments (i.e., international institutions in this 
analysis) based on their conductivity of either social 
influence or persuasion by identifying five characteristics 
(Rogowski, 1999):
1. Membership (dimension and inclusiveness);
2. Franchise (distribution of authoritativeness);
3. Decision rules (unanimity v. majority);
4. Mandate (the role of the institution);
5. Autonomy  (relation principal-agent).
This paper applies such typology to the World Bank 
in order to test its conductivity of a certain type of 
socialisation or another. This is not a mere theoretical 
exercise. Depending on which micro-process is at work, 
the actor analysed behaves in extremely different ways 
which are comprehensible through cognitive mapping. 
The World Bank as Social 
Environment
In social sciences the phenomenology of persuasion is 
based on three grounds: the active assessment of the 
content of the message (given that common standards 
are internalised),  the nature and the authoritativeness of 
the persuader and the characteristics of the persuadee 
(Johnston, 2001; Johnston 2008). Persuasion may be 
perceived as the sum of such factors which are difficultly 
isolatable one from the other. Johnston identifies 
certain social environments which are propelling of 
persuasion dynamics (Johnston 2001):
1. A small and exclusive membership bolsters a 
marked in-group identity which in turn enhances 
the persuasiveness of the ‘message’. Whilst members 
cooperating in the World Bank are very numerous4, 
there are several factors supporting a strong sense of 
belonging to a small elite. First of all, the number of 
net donors is relatively small and throughout history 
certain forms of closer cooperation among them 
have been created5. Secondly, the particular voting 
system of the World Bank allows the wealthiest 
and more economically significant states to take 
significant decisions without the necessity to foster 
coalitions with other members (Woods 2006). , when 
special majority is required the large vote-holders 
possess a sort of veto power6. As a consequence, a 
small group of donor states orbiting around the US 
monopolises the decision-making process sharing a 
marked in-group identity. 
2. When authoritativeness is unevenly allocated, it 
confers the norm-entrepreneur the capacity to 
“convince a critical mass of states to embrace new 
norms’’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Several factors 
4  Data are available at http://go.worldbank.org/
Y33OQYNE90 (accessed December 2010).
5  An example is represented by the Paris Club. For more 
information see http://www.clubdeparis.org/. With few exceptions, 
the same countries are also members of the G-20 (and other 
formations) and the Council of Ministers of the EU (in many cases 
the same minister take part in them).
6  For data regarding voting power within the World Bank 
see http://go.worldbank.org/VKVDQDUC10 (accessed December 
2010).
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bolster US influence over the World Bank and thus 
its role of norm-entrepreneur. First, the US holds, as 
the largest contributor, the highest share of votes 
thus allowing it to block any decision in case of 
special majority is needed— a requirement which 
has increased in time (Woods 2006). Second, the 
financial structure of the World Bank, being not 
dependent on subscriptions or levies by members, 
renders the US even more influential so long as it 
remains the largest contributor and the US dollar 
remains the core currency in the reserve assets. 
Third, the creation of the International Development 
Association (IDA) in 1960 increased US power even 
more. The fund on which such institution is based is 
subjected to periodic replenishments thus rendering 
the institution more dependent on the wealthiest 
states. Accordingly, the US has exerted its influence 
through IDA replenishment negotiations not only 
on such institution but on the World Bank as a whole 
(Kapur et al 1997). Furthermore, the increasing use of 
trust funds rendered the World Bank more porous to 
political pressures (Woods 2006). In the context of 
the Cold War, the US became even more willing to 
exploit its power to control the World Bank policies 
with the result of ‘geopoliticising’ them.
3. Consensus based voting rules enhance the 
actor propensity to analyze counter-attitudinal 
information repeatedly over time. Furthermore, 
such type of voting gives incentives for the 
creation of inter-subjective understandings due 
to its interactive and discursive character. Agents 
in social environments face uncertainty in taking 
decision and they rely on the information provided 
by epistemic communities. The role of political 
or scientific epistemic communities is not only 
characterised by reshaping policy frameworks, but 
also by the construction of agent’s identities and 
interests7 (Adler 2005). In shaping its development 
policy, the EU  has lacked the financial resources and 
the technical expertise to challenge the ‘ideology’ 
supported by the World Bank (Stevens and Killick 
1989). Although the World Bank is characterized by 
a (qualified) majority voting system, the weighting 
of votes in the World Bank fosters the creation of a 
consensus culture among the wealthiest countries, 
especially regarding the ‘meta-decisions’. 
4. The deliberative nature of the institutional mandate 
7  For a constructivist analysis of the creation of the Bretton 
Woods system based on the role of epistemic communities see 
Adler (2005). 
supports active complex cognitive activities 
whereby persuasion dynamics take place. Checkel 
(1999) emphasises the importance of the isolation 
of the group from external political pressures as a 
characteristic enhancing persuasion. Accordingly, if 
the meetings of the group consist only in ‘drafting 
sessions’, in which locked positions are transposed, 
no deliberative practices based on arguing will occur. 
The World Banks’s agencies hold high autonomy in 
providing loans and guarantees for specific projects. 
Furthermore, since its establishment the highly 
technical nature of the World Bank activities has 
allowed it to avoid salient issues, strengthening its 
autonomy and its in-group cohesion (Woods 2006).
5. The micro-processes of socialisation affect individuals 
or small groups, who are more likely to be persuaded 
if they enjoy a high level of discretionary power 
within the social environment. There may be several 
reasons why the relation principal-agent is loose, 
though the most common one in international 
institutions depends on the high technicality of the 
issues at stake (Johnston, 2008). The World Banks’s 
focus on specific projects has required the World 
Bank to employ high quality staff with technical 
expertise. Moreover, its autonomy in budgetary 
management allows it to “employ more staff at 
higher salaries, hire more consultants, commission 
more country studies, hold more seminars, issue 
more publications” (Kapur et al., 1997: 1165). Since 
the staff of the World Bank has never been hired 
according to national quotas, the appointment of 
staff has always focused on “the higher standards of 
efficiency and technical expertise” (World Bank, art. 
5). Moreover, the Articles of Agreement of the World 
Bank emphasise the independence of the Bank 
and its staff (World Bank, art. IV section 5)8, which 
has been characterised by a strong ‘internationalist 
credo’ since the its establishment (Staples, 2006)9.
In conclusion, the World Bank represents a social 
environment propelling of persuasion and accordingly, 
8  Such article reads “The Bank and its officers shall not 
interfere in the political affairs of any member state; nor shall they 
be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the 
member or members concerned. Only economic considerations 
shall be relevant to their decisions, and these considerations shall be 
weighted impartially on order to achieve the purposes of Article I”
9 For an inquiry into the origins and the consequences of 
such internationalist feeling typical of the World Bankers and the 
role played by World Bank’s first presidents Meyer and McCloy in 
bolstering it see Staples (2006). 
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the next section copes with the case study of the relation 
between the EU and ACP countries in order to test the 
effects of persuasion on the EU. Actually, European and 
national officials, who have worked within and/or have 
cooperated with the World Bank system, are the actors 
affected by the processes of persuasion, for persuasion is 
a social process at micro-level. “A constructivist ontology 
allows (even demands) that the unit of socialization 
is the individual or small group” (Johnston, 2001: 34). 
A caveat is needed. This article does not focus on 
preference-aggregation or preference-transformation 
at European level, though it assumes a certain influence 
exerted by the aforementioned national officials and 
politicians on the European decision-making process. 
Although acknowledging that this is not a trivial 
assumption, assessing the real influence of an actor in 
such a complex polity is beyond the objectives of this 
article. This study rests on the assumption that access 
to the decision-making process may be equated to 
influence for the sake of analytical simplicity.
Conditionality in the relation
EU-ACP
This article focuses on the World Bank as social 
environment and the ‘Washington consensus’10 of the 
1980s as the prevailing ideology therein (Woods, 2006; 
Arts and Dickson, 2004). Pro-norm behaviour of the 
agent is identified with the conditionality characterising 
EU development policy toward the ACP countries11. The 
cases in which the agent behaves consistently with the 
norms and values of the social environment even when 
acting outside it, such as the EU’s own development 
policy, are particularly revealing. Indeed, they allow the 
method of analysis to easily isolate persuasion dynamics 
from social influence dynamics. Social influence takes 
place exclusively when the agent is acting within the 
institution since it depends on social rewards which 
are tangible and valuable only in a defined social 
environment (its nature is structure-based). Differently, 
persuasion is a more agent-based phenomenon which 
may be alienated from the specific social environment 
but which continues to affect the actor. Several scholars 
have stressed the close interconnection between the 
conditionality promoted by the World Bank and the one 
10  For a detailed discussion on the ‘Washington consensus’ 
see Woods (2006) . 
11  Officially since Lomé IV, though Lomé III represented ‘a 
trial run’ (Brown, 2002).
typical of the EC since Lomé IV. Some of them, more 
implicitly, place EC conditionality within the broader 
discourse about North-South relations in the 1980s 
(Brown, 2002); whereas others, more explicitly, underline 
the influence of the IFIs principles and practices, stating 
that “EU adjustment support is indistinguishable from 
that of the IFIs” (Mailafia, 1996: 112). Nevertheless, 
they have hitherto black-boxed the mechanisms and 
processes whereby such an influence occurs.
Focusing on persuasion, the cognitive mapping method 
should reveal causal axioms and assertions regarding 
development policy beyond EU officials’ statements 
and EU documents with the following characteristics. 
First, they should stress the taken-for-granted and 
appropriate nature of the mainstream norms and values 
of the social environment. Table 1 illustrates statements 
by national or European first-ranking officials and 
sentences extrapolated from official documents. They 
represent cues of the profoundly radicated belief in 
the neoliberal approach to development policy (i.e. 
the ‘Washington consensus’) and they show how the 
European policy-makers conceived this credo as the 
only appropriate manner to cope with development 
assistance. Indeed, persuasion is based on the active 
assessment of the content of the message thus 
fostering an homogenisation of interests within the 
social environment (Johnston, 2001). When the social 
environment is structured in such a way that it allows 
arguing and deliberative dynamics, the agent is 
cognitively disposed to embody new norms and values. 
Table 1 illustrates examples of pro-norm behaviour in 
rhetorical terms: not only did European policy-makers 
adopt the policy paradigm of conditionality, but they 
also firmly believed that it represented the best (even 
the only) policy option available. Revealing in this 
regard are the statements of David Frisch, the then head 
of the DG in charge of development, and Manuel Marin, 
the then Commissioner (see Table 1). As shown, two of 
the key European officials in charge of development 
assistance conceived structural adjustment as a great 
achievement in that the best way to tackle this issue. 
This is the added value of cognitive mapping because 
it tests if there is consistency of attitudes, but it also 
extrapolates the motivations for that consistency. 
Second, the findings should reveal marked in-group 
solidarity toward the ‘community’ to which the agent 
belongs and especially in relation to the norm-
entrepreneur. Table 2 shows how European policy-
makers perceive their world as closely interconnected 
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 Logic of Appropriateness 
Venice Economic Declaration 
(G7 Summit, June 8-10 1987)
 “Three elements are needed to strengthen the 
growth prospects of debtor countries: the adoption 
of comprehensive macroeconomic and structural 
reforms by debtor countries themselves; the 
enhancement of lending by international financial 
institutions, in particular the World Bank; and 
adequate commercial bank lending in support of 
debtor country reforms.”
“For those of the poorest countries that are 
undertaking adjustment effort, consideration 
should be given to the possibility of applying lower 
interest rates to their existing debt, and agreement 
should be reached, especially in the Paris Club, on 
longer repayment and grace periods to ease the 
debt service burden”
EC Council of Ministers (Development), 1987 “Countries benefiting from the new fund have to 
fulfill three criteria … undertaking major policy 
adjustment programmes and reforms ”
L. Natali 
(EC Development Commissioner), 1988
“[Change the EU role from one in the past where] 
we have to a certain extent played a ‘fire brigade 
role’ to contribute to reform policies by giving direct 
support to countries pursuing policies and who are 
looking for this support”
 D. Frisch
(head of DGVIII EC Commission), 1988 
“ACP countries … they cannot choose between adjustment 
and the status quo. Their only option is ordered, properly 
managed adjustment or forced adjustment”
“[structural] adjustment has become the daily bread of the 
vast majority of the countries of Africa and a sine qua non of 
their dialogue with the outside world”
M. Marin 
(Vice-President of the EC Commission), 1990
“One of the greatest innovations of the new Convention 
[Lomé IV] is the formal inclusion of a mechanism to 
support the structural adjustment of the economies of 
the ACP countries”
“This is a new direction, as well as a logical, important 
and original development of Lomé policy”
“For the first time there has been a North-South 
Agreement on the philosophy underlying structural 
adjustment”
“The debt problem is obviously linked to structural 
adjustment. The political importance attached to this 
phenomenon is reflected by the inclusion in the new 
Convention of a specific chapter on debt.”
“There is no way that the viability and efficiency of 
projects in these countries can be ensured without 
general or sectoral reforms and structural adjustment is 
the result of this need to strike all the balances again - a 
new factor in the ACP  economies which Lomé IV could 
not ignore”
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Lomé IV, art. 23 “These instruments shall be directed mainly, by 
strengthening the established mechanisms and 
systems at: … supporting the ACP States’ structural 
adjustment efforts and thus contributing to the 
attenuation of the debt burden”
Lomé IV, art. 159 “support, at the request of the ACP States concerned, 
for operations and structures which promote the 
coordination of sectoral policies and structural 
adjustment efforts”
Lomé IV, art. 243 “The ACP States and the Community recognize 
that the economic and social problems being 
experienced by ACP States are the result of both 
internal factors and external developments. They 
see the need for urgent action and share the view 
that short and medium-term policies must reinforce 
the long-term development efforts and goals of 
ACP States. To this end, they have agreed that the 
Convention should provide structural adjustment 
support to assist ACP States in their effort”
EC Commission DG Information, 
Communication and Culture , 1992
“There is an obvious link between macroeconomic 
policies pursued in these countries [ACP countries] 
and the sectoral policies that the Community is 
requested to support”
“interdependence between programming and 
adjustment has provided the backdrop to the 
implementation of the Convention [Lomé IV]”
Table 1. Source: author’s own compilation
with the broader development landscape and 
how they see the cooperation with the IFIs as 
necessary and desirable. Solidarity towards 
the group is of fundamental importance: only 
if the social environment is fully legitimate to 
the agent, persuasion will occur. Agent must be 
cognitively motivated to analyse information 
and be involved in discursive dynamics 
(Johnston, 2008). Indeed, the weight attributed 
to informational stimuli or sets of values is 
inherently proportional to the perception an 
actor has of the source. Furthermore, in-group 
cohesiveness may trigger common jargons, 
common attitudes etc. which bolster arguing 
and in turn persuasion dynamics. The necessity 
of cooperation between the EU and the World 
Bank is markedly emphasised by the British 
Minister for Overseas Development and it is also 
clearly stated in the Convention (see Table 2).
Third, the perceived threats (also of social 
nature) from counter-attitudinal behaviour 
should be underestimated or absent. This 
characteristic is typical of social influence and 
its focus on social status markers. The presence 
of counter-attitudinal statements does not 
falsify the research question: it stresses the fact 
that actors feel completely free to diverge (not 
in marked degree though) from the mainstream 
‘doctrine’ and are not subjugated to any type of 
social pressure. Pro-norm factual behaviour and 
(moderate) rhetorical divergence is a typical 
scenario of persuasion dynamics, whereas the 
otherwise situation is characteristic of social 
influence. Indeed, social influence induces pro-
norm behaviour in function of the agent’s social 
status. The agent is willing to take pro-norm 
attitudes only in exchange of social rewards 
within the group. As a consequence, rhetorical 
consistency is the less costly way to demonstrate 
the embodiment of values. As regards actual 
attitudes, the agent will be tempted to free-ride 
when no social rewards or punishments are at 
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In-group solidarity
Venice Economic Declaration 
(G7 Summit, June 8-10 1987)
“We strongly support the activities of international 
financial institutions, including those regional 
development banks which foster policy reforms 
by borrowers and finance their programs of 
structural adjustment”
“We support the central role of the IMF through 
its advice and financing and encourage closer 
cooperation between the IMF and the World 
Bank, especially in their structural adjustment 
lending”
Bulletin of the EC 11-1987 
(regarding the G7 in Venice 1987) 
“EC support is to be integrated as far as possible 
with the WB and the IMF”
EC Council 
of Ministers (Development), 1987
“fund programmes ... in close coordination with 
the WB and the IMF”
EC Council 
of Ministers (Development), 1988
“effective coordination between the Community, 
on the one hand, and the WB and IMF, which play 
a leading role in the dialogue on adjustment”
British Minister for 
Overseas Development, 1988
“It makes no sense to argue one course in Brussels 
and another in Washington … close coordination 
with the Bank will be vital.  The quickest and 
most effective way to support recipients’ 
macroeconomic reforms is to work alongside the 
Bank”
British Minister for 
Overseas Development, 1988
“Supporting those who pursue adjustment 
should be at the centre of our strategy for aid”
“We must concentrate most the resources on 
quick disbursing aid to support economic reforms”
Lomé IV, art. 246 “ACP states undertaking reform programmes that 
are acknowledged and supported at least by the 
principal multilateral donors, or that are agreed 
with such donors but not necessarily financially 
supported by them, shall be treated as having 
automatically satisfied the requirements for 
adjustment assistance”
Table 2. Source: author’s own compilation
stake. Conversely, persuasion represents public 
conformity due to private acceptance (Johnston, 
2008), regardless the context. Accordingly, 
the agent behaves consistently and begins to 
perceive the embodied values as its own without 
acknowledging the influence exerted on it. Table 
3 illustrates the assertions and parts of official 
documents which stress this aspect, though the 
absence per se of statements etc. stressing the 
importance of status markers is revealing. 
The arbitrary choice of such sources is 
acknowledged, though such a fallacy is typical 
of this approach (even though in quantitative 
approaches the degree of discretionality in 
the hands of the researcher is of the same 
relevance) and it is also due to the limited 
access to sources. Furthermore, there is no 
pretence of comprehensiveness in the tables 
due to discretionality of the researcher and 
the traditional coupling of cognitive mapping 
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with institutional analysis (as the one above). 
Nevertheless, the tables provide the ground 
of the functioning of the micro-processes of 
socialisation (in this case persuasion) and the 
way it may be analysed. 
Conclusion
Cognitive mapping applied to crucial EC documents 
and policy-makers’ statements verifies the research 
question. In fact, the units of analysis show all the 
characteristics typical of the effects of persuasion 
dynamics. First of all, actors embodied new values 
according to a logic of appropriateness, without any 
utilitarian consideration. Secondly, they demonstrate a 
strong solidarity vis-à-vis the group, which is perceived 
as a legitimate forum. Thirdly, actors underestimate 
the importance of material or social benefits deriving 
from pro-norm behaviour. The latter is a fundamental 
factor underlying the difference between persuasion 
and social influence. These findings, added to the 
analysis of the institutional arrangements of the 
social environment, underline persuasion dynamics 
operating in the interaction between the EU and 
the World Bank in the case-study. The conditionality 
and the other novelties typical of the ‘new’ relations 
between the EC and the ACP countries inaugurated 
by the Lomé IV Convention were not related to the 
EC internal bureaucratic politics or to the decrease in 
the influence of the French associationist model (in 
turn due to the various enlargement waves)12. Nor 
were they a direct consequence of the changes in 
the world geopolitics (the end of the Cold War) and 
the consequent EU aspirations to become a political 
(and no more only an economic) giant. Needles to 
12  For a detailed inquiry into the role of French associationism 
in the EC development policy see Grilli (1994).
Counter-attitudinal behaviour
French Minister for Cooperation, 1988 “The IMF and the WB have a too purely economic 
view of it [adjustment], while we are trying to 
bring in social objectives ”
EC Council of Ministers (Development), 1988 “approach to adjustment  would be more realistic, 
pragmatic and differentiated than that of the 
Washington institutions … taking account of the 
peculiarities and constraints of any country … 
adjustment should be compatible with long term 
development ”
EC Council of Ministers (Development), 1989 “[not to] open up paths parallel to those followed 
by the WB and IMF or making Community 
activities subject to decisions taken by them 
alone”
EC Commission DG Information, 
Communication and Culture, 1990
“The 1980s were a period of severe economic 
difficulties for the majority of ACP States. To 
balance their budgets, many of them had to 
turn to the International Monetary Fund and 
the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (World Bank) for financial 
assistance. To obtain credit, they had to accept 
drastic economic reforms (structural adjustment 
programmes) designed by the IMF or the World 
Bank. The Washington doctor’s medicine was 
unpalatable, the prognosis depressing: Things 
may get worse before they get better”.
DG VIII, 1992 “The ideological neutrality of Lomé rules out the 
possibility of the Community living by doctrines, 
be they neo-liberal or otherwise”
Table 3. Source: author’s own compilation
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